

Alexander Donaldson, and  
John Donaldson, Bookellers, } Appellants.

Thomas Becket, Peter Abraham de Hondt,  
John Rivington, William Johnson, William  
Strahan, Thomas Longman, William Richard-  
son, John Richardson, Thomas Lowndes,  
Thomas Caflon, George Kearsley, Henry  
Baldwin, William Owen, Thomas Davies,  
and Thomas Cadell, Printers and Booksellers, } Respondents.

C A S E of the Appellants.

ON the 21st of January, 1771, the Respondents filed their Bill in the High Court of Chancery, and, among other Things, charged, that one JAMES THOMPSON was the Author of a Tragedy, called SOPHONISBA, and of a Poem entitled SPRING.

Bill filed Jan. 21st, 1771.  
James Thompson,  
Author of the Book  
in Question.

And that, on or about the 16th Day of January, 1729, He, the said JAMES THOMPSON, by Indenture, bargained and sold true Copies of the said Works to one ANDREW MILLAR, together with the sole and exclusive Right of Printing the same, for the Sum of £137:10.

16th Jan. 1729, he  
sold to Millar the  
Poem called Spring

That the said JAMES THOMPSON was also the Author of other Poems, entitled SUMMER, AUTUMN, WINTER, BRITANNIA, a Poem sacred to the Memory of Sir ISAAC NEWTON, a Hymn on the Succession of the Seasons, and an Essay on DESCRIPTIVE POETRY.

James Thompson,  
Author of 3 Poems  
and Hymn.

And that on the 28th Day of July, 1729, He, the said JAMES THOMPSON, bargained and sold the several Copies of the last-mentioned Poems to one JOHN MILLAN, together with the sole Right of Printing the same for £105.

28th July, 1729,  
sold same to John  
Millan.

The Respondents further charged, that, by Indenture, bearing Date the 16th of June, 1738, JOHN MILLAN sold to ANDREW MILLAR the Copies of the last-mentioned Poems, and the Right and Property of Printing, Publishing, and Vending the same, for the Sum of £105.

16th June, 1738,  
John Millan sells  
the last Poems to A.  
Millar.

That ANDREW MILLAR departed this Life in June, 1768, leaving JANE MILLAR (NOW JANE GRANT) WILLIAM MILLAR, and the Plaintiffs, THOMAS LONGMAN and THOMAS CADELL, his Executors.

June, 1768, Millar  
died.

That on the 13th of June, 1769, the several Copies above-mentioned, with the sole Right of Printing and Publishing the same, were sold at the Queen's-Arms Tavern, in St. Paul's Church-Yard, and that the Plaintiffs, in certain Proportions, were the Purchasers at and for the Sum of £505.

13th June, 1769,  
Millar's Represen-  
tatives sold by Auc-  
tion to the Respon-  
dents.

The Respondents then proceeded to charge, that the Appellants, notwithstanding the Premises, and without the Licence and Consent of the Respondents, published and sold several Copies of the above-mentioned Poems, called THE SEASONS, and the said HYMN on the Succession of the Seasons, each Copy being bound up in a single Volume, and entitled, The SEASONS, by James Thompson; Edinburgh, printed by A. Donaldson, 1768, thereby deriving to themselves great Gain, to the Detriment of the Respondents, who claimed to themselves the whole Profit arising from the Publication and Sale of the same.

Charge that Appel-  
lants sold without  
Licence from the  
Respondents.

And the Respondents further charged, that the Appellants had not at any Time purchased from the said JAMES THOMPSON the Right of printing and publishing the said Poems; but insisted, notwithstanding, upon the Liberty of selling the same, without accounting to the Respondents for the Price thereof.

Charge that Appel-  
lants refused to ren-  
der an Account.

The Respondents, therefore, prayed that the Appellants might come to an Account with the Respondents for all the Money by them received by Sale of the Poems, and pay the same to the Respondents, and should for the Future be restrained, by an Injunction, from publishing and vending any Copies of the said Poem, called the SEASONS, and the HYMN.

To this BILL, the Appellants put in their Answer, sworn the 16th of July, 1771, and thereby admitted, that the said THOMPSON was the Author of the Poems, called the SEASONS, and the HYMN: But, forasmuch as Twenty-eight Years (the longest Period allowed by the Statute of Queen Anne for the Monopoly of any new Work) had elapsed since the first Publication, and before the Appellants had printed or sold the same, they denied (and think themselves still warranted to deny) that the Respondents had, or could then have the sole Privilege of printing and uttering the SEASONS and the HYMN: And they admit the Publication and Sale of the said Poems, as charged by the Bill.

The Answer of the  
Appellants.  
28 Years Monopoly  
by 8th Anne, c. 10,  
had elapsed.  
Deny exclusive  
Right claimed by  
Respondents.

They admit also the Death of ANDREW MILLAR, and the Purchase made by the Respondents at the Queen's-Arms Tavern.

Appellants admit  
Publication of the  
Poems, Death of  
Millar, and the  
Charge in the Bill



On the Part of the Respondents several Witnesses were examined, and the said JOHN MILLAR deposed, that THOMPSON was the Author of the second Parcel of Poems in the Bill mentioned, and wrote great Part of the same at his House. That they were afterwards assigned to him by THOMPSON, and that he conveyed all his Right therein to ANDREW MILLAR.

Upon this State of the Case, it is observable that the Respondents derive a Title through Executors, *eo Nomine*; and not by Means of any specific Devise to them. From this it is conjectured, that they mean to claim some *Chattle* or other, and to complain of a Wrong done to that Species of Property.

Of Chattles it is certain, that they all go absolutely to Executors, together with all the Rights, which can exist in them. The Case is the same of Rights purely incorporeal, which lie *only in Action*, and are independent of any Subject real or personal, if they are for Terms of Years, as an Annuity, a Franchise, or a Privilege, (such as Monopolies, &c.) for a limited Time. But it is conceived, that a perpetual Annuity, Franchise, or Privilege, must be a Fee Simple, and descend to Heirs. If this be so, the main Difficulty will then consist in ascertaining the Chattle claimed by the Respondents, and how and in what Manner the Wrong complained of applies to it.

Vide Burrow, fol. 9, 10, 126.

The Bill was penned with extreme Caution by the Respondents, solicitous, as it should seem, to avoid entangling themselves in a Variety of Circumstances, which yet make Part of the SPECIAL VERDICT in the Cause of MILLAR and TAYLOR; and, in the Report of Sir James Burrow, are stated to be highly material, although in support of that Opinion no Reason is alledged. It may, therefore, be inferred, that the present Attempt is an Experiment to try how far the Doctrines of that Case may be extended beyond the Case itself. What was done with the Poems in Question, between the Time of their being first written and the 16th of January, or the 28th of July, 1729, (when the Copies were sold) does not appear in any Part of these Proceedings. The Respondents have not thought fit, in Support of their Claim, to alledge that the Author had neither published, sold, nor given *true Copies* of them, to other Persons before those particular Days; indeed, such an Allegation could not have been made with Truth, because it is notorious that they were published at separate and distinct Times, as they happened to be written. The Seasons, in particular, were found by the special Verdict, in the Cause of Millar and Taylor, to have been published in the Year 1727, at several Times between the Beginning of the Year 1727, and the End of the Year 1729, and of Course many *true Copies* of them were sold to various Persons, before the Purchases by Andrew Millar and John Millan supposed by the Bill. But it is immaterial to the present Claim, in what Manner, or with what View the Author published originally, since if any Property adhered to him, after and notwithstanding the first Publication, the same, without any Manner of Doubt, was disposable by him at his pleasure.

Vide special Verdict in Millar and Taylor Burrow fol. 5.

Upon the same Principle, the Respondents have industriously declined to charge, that the said James Thompson was a natural born Subject, or resident in that Part of Great Britain, called England; or that the Poems in Question were first printed and published in the City of London, the same having never before been published elsewhere; meaning, apparently, to insist that the Right which they claim, being derived from Property, cannot depend for its Existence on such Accidents: And that, therefore, this Case has to do with that

Vide Burrow fol. 9.

of Foreign Books, which do not, in their Apprehension, stand on a different Footing from Copies printed and published in the City of London.

Spec. Verdict fol. 8.

The Respondents have, for the above mentioned Reasons, declined to charge (if the Truth be so) that the Work now in Question was upon the said Purchases of the several Parts thereof, by the said ANDREW MILLAR and JOHN MILLAN, respectively, and before the Publication thereof, duly entered in the Register of the Company of Stationers of the City of London, as the whole and sole Property of the said Andrew Millar and John Millan; to avoid the Appearance of Recourse to a STATUTE, made in their Favour, but now under the ill-luck of being thought an Impediment. The Respondents, by the Omission of the above Circumstances, intend, no doubt, for Reasons sufficiently obvious, (if the Foundation of their Argument were found) that the Species of Right, to which they set up their Claim, is not liable to a Supposition that the Author has relinquished the Copy, and consequently given a general Licence to print.

Vide Burrow fol. 10.

Burrow, ibidem.

They deny that many of the best Books fall under that Description, and that a very little Evidence might be sufficient, after the Author's Death, to imply such a tacit Consent; as if the Book had not been ENTERED before Publication that it would be a Circumstance to be submitted to a Jury, "That the Copy was intended to be left open." In Fact, Mr. Thompson, their Author, died in 1748, and they disregard the Rest of the Inference. Besides, if they had admitted the Circumstance above stated to be material to themselves, it would have been equally so to the Author, who likewise omitted to enter his Poems in the Stationers' Register.

Vide special Verdict fol. 5.

For the same Reason, they have not pretended, that, from the Time of the said Two several Purchases, ANDREW MILLAR and JOHN MILLAN, and the Executors of the former, and their Assigns, have printed and sold the said Works as their Property, and now have, and constantly have had a sufficient Number of Books exposed to Sale at a reasonable Price. To their unbounded Claim of Property, it is certainly repugnant, that the Owner should be obliged to part with it at any Price, but that which he sets himself. Nor will they admit, that their Relief may be rebutted by shewing that they mean to enhance the Price; which is against Law. There is certainly no Law against it. The Statutes of 1st Richard the Third, and 25th Henry the Eighth, relate to the Importation of Books from Foreign Parts, and extend no Care to Property or Privilege: And the Price of Books has nothing to do with Ingrossing, Forestalling, Regrating, or any other Offences against the Police of a public Market.

Burrow, fol. 10.

Special Verdict fol. 5.

The Respondents have likewise forborne to charge, that, before the Reign of Queen Anne, it was usual to purchase from Authors the perpetual Copy-right of their Books, and to assign the same from Hand to Hand for valuable Considerations, and to make the same subject to Family Settlements for the Provision of Wives and Children: perhaps as judging, that if such a Property had always existed at Common Law, the Purposes to which it hath been applied, would be perfectly immaterial, and, if it did not exist, the Application of it to Family Interests would not be a sufficient Ground, to build up a new and unheard-of Property; perhaps conceiving, that what was done among others would not be received as Evidence in the Court of Chancery; perhaps convinced,



convinced that no such Usage could be proved, or that such Usage, if stated in all its Circumstances, would be seen advantageous to Bookfellers only, and not to Authors, and upon the Whole might turn out just so much of nothing to their Purpose.

They have likewise avoided to charge any supposed BYE-LAWS of the Stationers Company, perhaps aware, that such BYE-LAWS would imply a special Right created by themselves, and extending only to their own Members; perhaps, considering that the Appellants (not being Members of that Company) would not be affected by such BYE-LAWS, even to the extent of making them competent Evidence: Perhaps, apprehending that such BYE-LAWS would throw a Light upon the imaginary Usage above-mentioned, and by revealing the *Origin, Nature and Extent of the Property* contended for, point the Force of it against their own Argument.

The Question, therefore, before the Court of Chancery, stood in this simple Form: Whether the Author, having sold and delivered, for a competent Price, ONE OR FIVE HUNDRED TRUE COPIES of his Work, retains in each of the Copies so sold and delivered (by the true Construction of such Contract) the mere and absolute Dominion and Property, conveying to the Vendee no more than a special and limited Use thereof; or *à converso*, whether such Vendee, or rather Baillee, acquires (by the true Construction of the Contract of Sale and Delivery) no absolute Property to himself, but only a Right of using, to a certain Extent, the Property of another?

If this Proposition be maintainable by the Respondents, the Consequence insisted upon is, that in respect of the Property so retained, the mere and absolute Owner, viz. THE PERSON WHO HAS SOLD, may maintain an Action for the exclusive Use of it by the Baillee, viz. the BUYER.

To avoid the difficulty of making out the whole of this Idea, some have taken Part of it, and they divide it thus.

Every Book, they say, consists of Two distinct Parts, the material Part, namely, the Paper, Print, and Binding, which is a Manufacture; and the immaterial Part, namely, the Doctrine contained in it, which is the Facture of the Mind. The Property in the material Part passes according to the Law in all other Cases; but the Property in the immaterial Part remains to the Author, which is about as intelligible, as if one should state JOHN to be the Owner of the CARCASE and LIMBS of the Horse, and THOMAS the Owner of his Colour, his Shape, Speed and Mettle.

This seems to have led to an elaborate Discussion of the Principles of Property; whether it could exist in an Idea for want of Substance, Physical Locality, distinguishing Marks, and many other Enquiries of the same Abstract Nature. A mere *scio-machia*, wherein, by no uncommon Accident, the Absurdity of the Position made a serious Answer seem ridiculous.

Some have stated the Property to exist in the Profits of the Sale, which (as they assume for the Purpose) belong to the original Author. But this is only substituting another, and as it seems, a less proper Phrase in the place of the Word MONOPOLY, which, to use the Words of *Brook*, is *Property not properly known*. The Privilege, however, of Monopoly is an Interest or Estate well known to the Law. It only remains to shew what Title the Author has to it.

Some have contented themselves with declaiming upon the *Moral Finess*, the *Reasonableness*, the *Justice*, and *Public Conveniency* of putting into the Hands of an AUTHOR the Means of raising upon the World, for his own Profit, the utmost Sum of Money for the Use of his Book, and this can only be done by giving him a MONOPOLY. Now, if the Truth of all this were admissible and clear, it would prove, at most, that it OUGHT to be done, NOT that it HAS BEEN done; and that those, who alone CAN do it, ought to consider and pronounce upon it. But, in fact, they have considered of it, and pronounced upon it otherwise.

Some contend, that such a Monopoly is already established by Law, and appeal to Usage for the Proof of it: But the Usage adduced is incompetent, for want of Time beyond Memory, and, in Truth, does not exist, as appears abundantly by the Instances produced to prove it.

Some draw their Proof of the Common Law from the INJUNCTIONS granted by the Court of Chancery, admitting (or rather insisting) that such INJUNCTIONS ought to be granted, ONLY, where the Common Law is known and clear; admitting also, that the Case is NEW to the Common Law, and was therefore properly sent thither by the Court of Chancery. After which, it will not be wonderful if Injunctions, granted in a COURT of EQUITY, should not be thought an indisputable Proof of the Common Law.

On the 16th of November 1772, the Cause came on to be heard in the High Court of Chancery, 16th Nov. 1772, when the Court was pleased to decree, that the Injunction, which had been granted, *pendente Lite*, to restrain the Appellants from publishing any more Copy or Copies of the several Poems or Hymn, or any of them, should be made perpetual, "and that it be referred to a Master in Chancery to take an Account of what had been received by the Appellants, or either of them, or by any other Person, by their or either of their Order, or for their or either of their Use, by, from, or on Account of publishing and Selling of the Poems in the Pleadings mentioned, and that the Appellants should pay to the Respondents what should be found due from them on the Ballance of the said Account, and reserve the Consideration of Costs until after the Master should have made his Report."

The Appellants, apprehending themselves to be aggrieved by this Decree, have appealed from it, and humbly hope that it will be reversed, for the following, among other

#### REASONS.



## R E A S O N S.

- I. The Object contended for by the Respondents, is of so abstruse and chimerical a Nature, that it is hardly capable of being defined. It is sometimes called PROPERTY, and for the Sake of Distinction, LITERARY PROPERTY. The Word PROPERTY has various Significations. In a Philosophical Sense, the Qualities, inherent in any Subject or Thing, are called its PROPERTIES. In a Civil Sense, PROPERTY is CORPOREAL or INCORPOREAL. CORPOREAL PROPERTY is the actual Possession of some Substance, with the Power of enjoying and disposing of it. The Object now contended for is not CORPOREAL PROPERTY. INCORPOREAL PROPERTY is of two Sorts; First, it is a Right relating to some Substance, as a Right to take the Profits of Land, without having the Possession of the Land, or a Title to it. 2dly, It is a right to exercise some Faculty, or to do some particular Thing for Profit. The perception of the Profits, is a taking of some Substance, or CORPOREAL PROPERTY; and hence the *incorporeal Right* is metaphorically called PROPERTY. The Word, thus used, becomes equivocal, importing alternately the *Right* and the Profits resulting from the *Right*. In like manner *Land* and the *Right* to it, are both called PROPERTY. If the Object of the Respondents be an *incorporeal Right*, it is a mere Right to do some particular Thing for Profit. The Thing to be done is the *multiplying of Copies of Books*. The SOLE RIGHT of *multiplying Copies*, is a *sole Right* to exercise a *natural Faculty*, and this, it is obvious, is an EXTRAORDINARY PRIVILEGE. A sole Right to take the Profits arising from the Exercise of a *natural Faculty*, is a MONOPOLY in itself very extraordinary. This PRIVILEGE and this MONOPOLY, the Respondents chuse to call their *Property*, and they are to maintain their Title to it at *Common Law*. But by that Law, it is submitted, on the Part of the Appellants, that the PRIVILEGE and MONOPOLY never did, and never can exist.
- II. A Right at Common Law must be founded upon Principles of CONSCIENCE and NATURAL JUSTICE. CONSCIENCE and NATURAL JUSTICE are not Local or Municipal. NATURAL JUSTICE is the same at *Athens*, at *Rome*, in *France*, *Spain*, and *Italy*. Copies of Books have existed in all Ages, and they have been multiplied; and yet an *exclusive Privilege*, or the *sole Right* of ONE MAN to multiply Copies, was never dictated by NATURAL JUSTICE in any Age or Country, and of Course the *sole Liberty* of vending Copies could not exist of *common Right*, which gives an equal Benefit to all.
- III. An EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGE to exercise a *natural Faculty* is an Encroachment upon the Rights of Man. A NATURAL FACULTY differs from the Execution of an OFFICE. An OFFICE is the Work of civil Policy, and being of *positive Institution*, may be granted to ONE, without Injury to the rest: But when that, which of *common Right* should be Free to all, becomes confined to any ONE MAN, or any BODY OF MEN, the rest of the Community suffer an Abridgement of their natural Liberty. But such a Restraint of the LIBERTY of MANY, for the Sake of ONE, was never established by NATURAL JUSTICE. If it ever has existed, it has been the *Creature* of the CIVIL MAGISTRATE upon Principles of Policy; but the Respondents disclaim the Aid of the LEGISLATURE upon the present Question, and derive their Claim from the COMMON LAW.
- IV. The Common Law has ever regarded *Public Utility*, the MOTHER of *Justice* and of *Equity*. *Public Utility* requires that the Productions of the Mind should be diffused as wide as possible, and therefore the *Common Law* could not, upon any Principles consistent with itself, abridge the Right of multiplying Copies. When the *Common Law* took Root in this Kingdom, Literary Composition stood, in regard to the manner of making it Public, upon the same Footing as in *Greece* or *Rome*. WRITING was, in those States, the *only Method* of multiplying Copies. To transcribe or copy out a Book was the Right of every Individual; there was no other Way of propagating Knowledge: Of a perpetual Right in ONE MAN to write out Books or to make Copies, there is not a single Trace in any Author that has come down from Antiquity. ATTICUS retained a Number of Slaves trained up to Writing, and it appears in TULLY's Epistles, that ATTICUS transcribed, not only for his own Use, but to sell again to CICERO.
- In like Manner the natural Liberty of transcribing Books was never checked by the Common Law. From AMES, and other Compilers of the History of Letters, we learn, that, from the slow Progress of *transcribing*, Books were held up at an enormous Price. *Livy* was sold for 120 Crowns of Gold for each Book, and a French Romance, called "*Le Romans de la Rose*," was sold for 33l. 6s. 6d. The Common Law could not with Justice uphold a Price so prejudicial to the Cause of Learning. Accordingly He, who possessed a BRAXTON or a CHAUCER, had an undoubted Right to make as many *true Copies* as He pleased. A MONOPOLY would have been pernicious, and Learning, in Consequence, must have gone to Ruin.
- V. The *Common Law* is IMMEMORIAL USAGE. If, therefore, THERE WAS A TIME, when the PRIVILEGE and MONOPOLY, now contended for, could not, and in Fact did not exist at *Common Law*, they never can exist by *that Law*. But SUCH A TIME has been, namely, from the Beginning of our History down to the GREAT ÆRA of Printing; and Printing (which is *only* a more expeditious Method of multiplying Copies) it is contended, could not change the Principles of Right and Wrong, or innovate the Law.



Printing was invented at Mentz in Germany, Anno 1458.

In 1471 CAXTON, a Mercer, of London, brought the Art into this Kingdom. In Acts of Parliament it is called a *Trade*, or *Manufacture of the Kingdom*. To exercise the Art was the Right of the Subject; in this Light the first Printers considered it. CHAUCER's Works were printed by CAXTON 1498, when the Author had long been dead. Another Edition of Chaucer was soon given by Thomas Godfrey. Littleton's Tenures were printed 1481, by John Letton, and in a short Period, by Richard Pynson 1526, by Thomas Berthelet 1530, by William Rastall 1534, by Robert Redman 1540. Pynson, indeed, says, in the Wit of that Age, that Redman should be called *Rudeman*, *quia Hominum Rudiores vix Invenias*. He abuses Redman's Edition, but not a Word about an Invasion of Property.

*Objection.* It is said, on the Part of the Respondents, that the Name "*Copy of a Book*," has been a Term for *Ages*, to signify the *sole Right of Printing, Publishing, and Selling*, and that this *Species of Property* has existed in *Usage* as long as the Name.

*Answer.* It is admitted on the Part of the Respondents, that there is no Bye-Law or Ordinance relative to Copies till after the Year 1640. The Usage, whatever it be, is therefore not immemorial.

*Objection.* From the Erection of the Stationers Company, Copies were entered as *Property*, and *Pirating* was punished.

*Answer.* The Common Law, according to this, begins with the Stationers Company.

The first Charter was 1556, 3d and 4th Phil. and M. The Grant was founded on Principles of Bigotry, to prevent, as it recites, the *Renewal of great and detestable Heresies*. The New Members of the Company (in Number 97) were made *Literary Constables* to search for Books, &c. and, though the Crown had no Right over the Trade of Printing, it was ordered, "*That no Man shall exercise the Mystery of Printing, unless He be of the Stationers Company, or have a Licence.*"

To this Company so constituted, and thus armed with a GENERAL WARRANT, we are referred for Evidence of the *Common Law*.

*Objection.* Anno 1558, the Charter was confirmed in the 1st of Elizabeth. In that Year there are Entries of Copies to particular Persons, and down from that Time.

*Answer.* Patent Rights began soon after the first Introduction of Printing. FROISSART's *Chronicles of England, France, and Spain* were published, *cum Privilegio a Rege indulto*, by RICHARD PINSON, 1525. From that Time the Patents "*ad solum imprimendum*" were innumerable. Men, who had such Rights, might enter their Books as *Property* in the Stationers Register. But neither the *Patent*, nor the *Entry*, can be now received as Evidence of a *Common Law Right*. The Charter embraced all the Printers in England: The New Company had the *sole Privilege of printing*, and they agreed to divide the Spoil among themselves; but *Authors were not Parties* to the Agreement.

*Objection.* The Stationers Company was empowered to make Bye-Laws.

*Answer.* They were; and those BYE-LAWS might create a *relative Right* among the Members of the Company.

In 1681, a BYE-LAW declares, that where a Book was entered to any Member, such Person, by *antient Usage of the Company*, has been *reputed and taken* to be the PROPRIETOR. By *antient Usage of the Realm* had been more conducive to the Point. But it was not competent to the Stationers Company to make Laws for the rest of the Kingdom; and, if it had, it would not be *Common Law*.

*Objection.* The Decrees of the STAR-CHAMBER have been cited as strong Authorities in Support of the Bye-Laws and Customs of the Stationers Company.

*Answer.* The STAR-CHAMBER was a *Criminal Court*, and had not constitutional Authority to determine *civil Rights*. That Court has been long since abolished, without Regret, and it is the Happiness of the Subject, that the *Common Law* has flowed through purer Channels.

*Objection.* It has been said, that a STAR-CHAMBER Decree, 1637, expressly supposes a *Copy-Right* to exist, OTHERWISE than by *Patent, Order, or Entry*; which could only be by *Common Law*.

*Answer.* The relative Rights of the Company were supported *per fas et nefas*, in those Times of high Prerogative: *Licences* from the ARCHBISHOP of CANTERBURY were frequent, and such LICENCES, it is submitted, were neither PATENT, ORDER, or ENTRY. And, moreover, a *Common Law Right* is never expressly mentioned in any Ordinance, Proclamation, or Bye-Law. It is often called the *Right, Privilege, Authority, or Allowance* SOLELY TO PRINT. Had the STAR-CHAMBER, and the HIGH COMMISSION COURT, expressly stated a *Common Law Right*, it could not be received as an Authority in Point; and it is submitted, that a *Common Law Usage* cannot arise by mere Implication from dark Hints of the STAR-CHAMBER. The same Argument applies to Acts of the PRIVY-COUNCIL, to Edicts, Proclamations, the Ordinance of the two Houses in 1642, and all the Ordinances during the Usurpation. This whole Body of Precedents forms the History of *Despotism*, NOT of the *Common Law*. The most that can be said in their Favour is, that they supported an Usage first set on Foot by *Acts of State*, by *Patents, Bye-Laws, &c.*

*Objection.*



*Objection.* It has been said, that in those Times Copies were protected by a much speedier and more effectual Remedy than *Actions at Law*, or *Bills in Equity*.

*Answer.* One successful *Action at Law* would have been a better Proof of the Right, than a thousand Instances of *Arbitrary Power*.

*Objection.* The LICENSING ACT has been called in Aid by the Respondents, and they observe, that the Printing of any Book WITHOUT CONSENT of the OWNER is forbid by that Act.

*Answer.* The OWNERSHIP was created by *Patent, Order, Bye-Laws* of the Stationers, &c. and if that Act recognized a *Right so created*, it was an ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE; but the Act, with all the other Encroachments upon Liberty, has long since gone to Rest, to revive no more.

*Objection.* It has been said, that soon after the Expiration of the LICENSING ACT, 9th May, 1679, 31 Car. II. there was a Case, as appears by LILLIE'S ENTRIES, fol. 67, Hilary Term, 31 Car. II. *Ponder and Bradyll*, for printing 4000 Copies of the *Pilgrim's Progress*, whereof the Plaintiff was Proprietor.

*Answer.* It is a Declaration, ONLY, in the Book of a *Special Pleader*, and if the Defendant printed and exposed to Sale FOUR THOUSAND BOOKS, he was left in Possession of them.

*Objection.* The Respondents, as if conscious that the Ground of Bye-Laws of the Stationers, Ordinances, &c. is not tenable, resort to a *Court of Equity*, and rely much upon the Injunctions that have issued out of the *Court of Chancery*.

*Answer.* The Injunctions of CHANCERY may be all drawn into a narrow Compass, and it will be seen, that they do not apply to the Point in Question.

#### I. Injunctions before the 8th of Anne, c. 10.

15th Nov. 1681. Stationers against Lee, for printing Pfalters and Almanacs.

17th Nov. 1681. Stationers against Wright, for publishing Almanacs.

9th and 22d Feb. 1709. Stationers against Partridge, for selling Almanacs.

All these are Prerogative Rights.

#### II. Injunctions upon the Right given by the Statute of Queen Anne.

9th Nov. 1722. Knaplock against Curl, for printing Prideaux's Directions to Church-Wardens.

11th Dec. 1722. Tonson against Clifton, for Sir Richard Steele's Conscious Lovers.

19th and 23d May, 1729. Gulliver against Watson, for printing Pope's Dunciad.

28th Nov. 1735. Motte against Falkiner, for Pope and Swift's Miscellanies.

27th Jan. 1736. Walthoe against Walker, for Nelson's Festivals.

6th Dec. 1737. Ballex against Watson, for Gay's Polly.

13th March, 1740. Gyles against Wilcox, for Hale's Pleas of the Crown.

19th May, 1740. Read against Hodges, for History of Peter the Great.

6th Nov. 1757. Tonson against Mitchell, for Byng's Expedition to Sicily.

#### III. Injunctions for printing unpublished Manuscripts without Licence from the Author.

24th May, 1732. Webb against Rose, for Webb's Conveyancer.

5th June, 1741. Pope against Curl, for printing Pope's Letters.

13th June, 1741. Forrester against Waller, for Forrester's Reports.

Duke of Queensbury against Shebbeare, for Clarendon's Life.

Trinity Term, 1768. Macklin against Richardson, for printing Love A-la-Mode.

#### I V. Injunctions as to Old Books after the 21 Years granted by the 8th Anne.

5th June, 1735. Eyre against Walker, for The Whole Duty of Man.

N. B. This could not be the Old Duty of Man; if it was, the Right must have been founded upon an Assignment from the Author, and the Author is unknown to this Hour.

20th April, and 11th May, 1752. Tonson against Walker, for Dr. Newton's Milton.

#### V. Injunctions relative to Books after the Twenty-eight Years given by the 8th Anne.

Trinity Term 1765. Millar against Donaldson, for Thompson's Seasons—Pope's Iliad—Swift's Works, with the Life and Notes by Dr. Hawkesworth.

Here as to Swift's Works, (the Notes and Life being within the Statute) the Injunction was continued.

As to Thompson's Seasons, and Pope's Iliad, (being beyond the 28 Years of 8th Anne) the Injunction was dissolved.

From these Cases it appears, that the General Question touching "the Common Law Right" has never been determined by any CHANCELLOR.



VI. MECHANICAL INSTRUMENTS, and also PRINTS made by *Engravers*, have ever been open to all Artists, unless secured to the INVENTOR by *Patent*, or by *Act of Parliament*. Between such *Inventions* and *Copies of Books* no sensible Distinction can be made. An *Orrery* represents the *Planetary System*: He, who makes one after the first Model, takes the Science of Astronomy as represented by the *Orrery*: And he, who prints a Book, takes the *Author's Sentiments*. — Where is the Difference?

VII. *Prerogative Copies*, such as the *Bible*, and Books of *Divine Service*, do not apply to the present Case. They are left to the Superintendence of the Crown, as the HEAD and SOVEREIGN of the STATE, upon Principles of *public Utility*. To ascribe to the CROWN a perpetual Right to the BIBLE upon Principles of *Property*, is to make the CROWN turn BOOKSELLER. If it be true, that the KING paid for the Translation of the Bible, it was a Purchase made for the whole BODY OF THE PEOPLE, for the Use of the Kingdom.

*Acts of Parliament*, it is admitted, are the Work of the LEGISLATURE, and therefore under the Direction of the CROWN, as the *executive Part* of the CONSTITUTION. *Property*, therefore, is NOT the Foundation of *Prerogative Copies*.

King Charles I. published a Translation of *David's Psalms*, written, as his MAJESTY says in the Preface, by his ROYAL FATHER. But the Idea of a *perpetual Property* was not then conceived, and therefore a *Patent* was granted to give the sole Right to the BOOKSELLER.

*Objection.* It has been said, that the Authority of such a Man as MILTON is of great Weight. He is represented as speaking, *after much Consideration*, on the very Point, and his Words are, "The just Retaining of each Man's Copy, which God forbid should be gainsaid."—*Milton's Prose Works*, 1 Vol. Quarto, fol. 172.

*Answer.* MILTON, in the Close of his famous Speech "for the Liberty of unlicensed Printing," in 1644, says, the Ordinance of the two Houses for subjecting the Press to a *Licensor* was obtained by indirect Means. "It may," says he, *be doubted whether there was not in it the Fraud of some OLD PATENTEES and MONOPOLIZERS in the Trade of Bookselling, who, under Pretence of the Poor in their Company not to be defrauded, and the just retaining of each Man's Copy (which God forbid should be gainsaid) brought divers glossing Colours to the House,*" &c.

MILTON's Idea of *each Man's Copy* arises from the Old PATENTEES and MONOPOLIZERS, and certainly, while there was a RELATIVE PROPERTY in the Stationers Company, the poorer Members ought not to be defrauded. He does not say, how long the Copy should be retained, and that is the Point in this Cause. It may be presumed, MILTON could not wish, that *Paradise Lost*, which was sold for 5l. and two further Sums of 5l. to be paid conditionally, should continue a SPLENDID FORTUNE in the Hands of a BOOKSELLER, and his GRAND-DAUGHTER be obliged to beg a *Charity-Play* at Drury-Lane Theatre. 1752.

DOCTOR SWIFT and Mr. PULTENEY were both clearly of Opinion, that there was *no Common Law Right*, (vide *Swift's Letters*, Vol. iii.) and the Opinion of such a Man as Mr. PULTENEY, who was for Years of the first Ability in Parliament, may be allowed to have some Weight.

DOCTOR WATTS published a Volume of Sermons in 1720: Mr. LONGMAN, one of the Respondents, republished it in 1758; and though the Period of 28 Years was expired, a *Common Law Right*, if it existed, would have protected the *Property*: But the Respondent, LONGMAN, annexed to his Edition a *Patent* for 14 Years, dated the 21st March, 1758.

VIII. Whatever Encouragement may be due to AUTHORS, the *Common Law* cannot, after the Silence of Ages, pronounce at once upon a *new Species of Right*, which has been hitherto "*Property not properly known.*"

*Bank Notes* are of a Value well ascertained, and yet the Common Law did not adapt itself to that *Emergence of Commerce*, but it was for the LEGISLATURE to make the stealing it or taking it by a Robbery a FELONY. 2 Geo. II. C. 25.

IX. The Statute of Queen Anne was not *Declaratory* of the COMMON LAW, but *Introductory* of a NEW LAW, to give learned Men a *Property* which they had not before.

*Objection.* It has been contended on the Part of the Respondents, that the Act of Queen Anne is an ACCUMULATIVE STATUTE, declaring the *Common Law*, and giving additional Penalties. In support of this, a Pamphlet, said to have been given to the Members in 1709, has been cited, and it appears that the Booksellers meant to inculcate the Idea of *antient Usage*, but what that Usage was, how it took its Origin, and how it was stated in the Pamphlet, the Extract leaves in Obscurity. Vide *Burrow*, fol. 19.

*Answer.* Cotemporary Exposition will, no doubt, deserve Attention. To this End, the History of the Bill, as it stands upon the Journals of the House of COMMONS, together with the Account of the Conference with the LORDS, will clearly evince, that the LEGISLATURE were not employed in SECURING an antecedent *Property*, but expressly declared, "that AUTHORS and Booksellers had the sole Property of Books VESTED in them, by that Act, for the Terms therein mentioned." Vide the Journals 12th December 1709, when the Booksellers Petition was presented; also their 2d Petition, 2d Feb. 1709—14th March 1709, resolved that the Title be a Bill for the Encouragement of Learning, by VESTING the COPIES

in



in the Authors or Purchasers, &c. 5th April the Bill returned from the Lords—5th April 1710, a Conference with the Lords and Mr. ADDISON, one of the Commons.

*Objection.* Of this Evidence the Respondents feel the Weight, and therefore they resort to a *Variety of Comments* upon the STATUTE itself.

They rely much upon the *Preamble*: The Words are, "Whereas Printers, Booksellers, and other Persons, have of late frequently taken the Liberty of printing, &c. Books and other Writings without the Consent of the Authors or Proprietors of such Books, to their very great Detriment, and too often to the Ruin of them and their Families; for preventing therefore such Practices, for the future, &c."

From the Words "taking the Liberty," and "such Practices," it is inferred that the Persons within the Description of them, were WRONG DOERS. A Question is put, When the Legislature speak of a Liberty taken, could they mean a *Claim founded on any Right*? And by "Practices," did they mean to describe the Exercise of a *legal Right*? The Word "Practices" is properly applied to the doing of *illegal Acts*.

*Answer.* If they were *Wrong-doers*, the LEGISLATURE has used the mildest Terms in the compass of our Language; but it is submitted that they were not *Trespassers*. After the final Extinction of the Licensing Act, 1694, Men had a Right to re-print Books in the same manner as PRINTSELLERS had lawful Authority to copy, engrave, and publish *all Works, Designs, and Prints* which were not secured to the INVENTORS by PATENT for a Term of Years; and yet the Legislature, 8 Geo. II. C. 13. in the very same Words recites in the Preamble, "Whereas divers Printfellers, &c. have of late frequently taken the Liberty of copying, engraving, and for preventing therefore such Practices, &c."

Again, in the 7 Geo. III. C. 38. the Printfellers who engraved and exposed to Sale the *Designs and Prints* of the late WILLIAM HOGARTH, after the Period of fourteen Years granted to him by PARLIAMENT, are in that Act called the PROPRIETORS of the Copies of WILLIAM HOGARTH'S Works, and then the LEGISLATURE proceeds to *restrain* those very PROPRIETORS from vending the Copies, which were their *legal Property*.—Thus it is plain, that the LEGISLATURE speaking of a *legal Right*, described it by the Words "taking the Liberty," and such "Practices."

If by the Terms, "taking the Liberty," and such "Practices," it can, by fair Construction, be intended that *Injustice, Fraud and Rapine* are implied, the like Imputation is thrown upon the *Printfellers*, who exercised a *legal Right*, and are allowed to be PROPRIETORS.

It may be presumed, that if the LEGISLATURE had perceived actual *Guilt* or *illegal Practices*, they would, agreeably to their own Dignity, have kept no Terms with Men, who *violated Laws*, and wrought the *Ruin of Families*.

But Learning, to the Honour of the LEGISLATURE, was to be encouraged; and it may be asked, if the *Statute of Queen Anne* did not create a *new Property*, what was done for Learning?

If the Right was *antecedent* to the Act, How did the LEGISLATURE *vest* the Property in Authors?

If the LEGISLATURE had the faintest Idea of a *pre-existing Property*, why was the *sole Right* of reprinting Books, which had been *previously* published, restrained to twenty-one Years, and no more? A strange Way of *encouraging Learning*, by abridging *ancient Rights*!

If the *Act of Queen Anne* intended merely to give *additional Penalties*, by Way of new Fences to a *common Law Right*, Why give those Penalties for fourteen Years only? If the Property is *perpetual*, Why should not the Remedy be *Co-extensive*?

If by "Copy" be understood a *perpetual Property*, the Author who sold his Copy under the Idea of a Transfer for *fourteen Years only*, may be told by an *artful Bookfeller*, that *more was meant than meets the Ear*, and that a Sale of his Copy imports a SALE FOR EVER. The Consequence will be, that, instead of encouraging Learning, a Snare has been *un-wittingly* spread for Men of Genius and Industry, and the *Clause* of the STATUTE, which gives a Reversion to the AUTHOR at the End of fourteen Years, *if he live so long*, will be eluded by the Craft, and, as MILTON phrases it, by the *Sophisms of Merchandize*.

If the Book, at the End of fourteen Years, reverts to the Author, his Interest is served: If it does not, the LEGISLATURE, by such a Construction, has extended *no Benefit to learned Men*.

But happily it appears that PARLIAMENT has revised its own Acts, and in Terms as clear as the English Language affords, declared, that the *Property was given* by the Act of Queen Anne. FOR

7. G. II. C. 24. is intitled, "An Act for granting to Samuel Buckley the *sole Liberty* of Printing and Reprinting the *Histories of Thuanus*. The Preamble recites, "that Buckley at a very great Expence had prepared an Edition of THUANUS in 7 Volumes Folio, "and then adds," Whereas the *sole Liberty of printing and reprinting Books* for the Term of *fourteen Years*, to commence from the Day of the publishing the same, GRANTED TO THE PROPRIETORS THEREOF, by an Act made in the 8th Year of Queen Anne, intitled, an Act for the *Encouragement of Learning*, BY VESTING THE COPIES of printed Books in the AUTHORS OR PURCHASERS, &c."

Of the Sense and Meaning of the Legislature, we are now *fully informed* by the HIGHEST AUTHORITY: He that runs may read the Intent and Scope of the Statute: "The *sole Liberty of Printing and Reprinting* for the Term of fourteen Years was GRANTED by the 8th of "Queen Anne."

The Law was made for the *Encouragement of Learning*: INGENUITY has endeavoured to puzzle it, but the LEGISLATURE has given the Exposition.

X. The Notion of "a PERPETUAL PRIVILEGE AND MONOPOLY," was, within a few Years, hatched among the Bookfellers; who now come with *glossing Colours*, and, under a Pretence of serving the Cause of Literature, mean only to get the *Fruits of Genius* into their own Hands,



Hands for ever. But the Consequences of this new Doctrine (were it established) would be fatal to the *Interest of Letters*, and the *Fame* of every valuable Author.

Books may be held up at too high a Price. Notes and Illustrations may be wanted, and generally are, in thirty or forty Years; not only the *Manners*, but even *Science* changes in the Progress of Time. *Moral Philosophy*, and *Mathematicks* should keep pace with the Vicissitudes of the World. Useful Commentaries upon valuable Works cannot be made without the Licence of the BOOKSELLER, who has purchased the Copy: His *Avarice*, his *Timidity*, or his *Want of Sense* may tell even the ORIGINAL AUTHOR, that he shall not re-print his OWN BOOK with further Improvements. If the Author should happily be permitted to do it, it must be upon the Bookseller's Terms; but more probably the Frugality of the BOOKSELLER will grudge an additional Expence, and taking upon him to pronounce upon *Wit*, he may say, that he likes the Book as it is.

MILTON, in his famous Speech, has thought this Head of Argument an important Topic against a *Licencer of the Press*. His Words are, "What if the Author shall be one so *Copious of Fancy*, as to have MANY THINGS, well worth the adding, come INTO HIS MIND after LICENSING, while the Book is yet under the Press, which not seldom happens to the best and diligentest Writers, and that perhaps a dozen Times in one Book. The Printer dares not go beyond his licensed Copy; so often then must the Author TRUDGE TO HIS LEAVE-GIVER, that those his NEW INSERTIONS may be viewed; and many a Jaunt will be made, ere that Licencer (for it must be the same Man) can either be found, or found at leisure: Mean while either the Press must stand still, which is no small Damage, or the Author LOSE HIS ACCURATEST THOUGHTS, and send the Book forth into the World, WORSE THAN HE COULD MAKE IT, which to a diligent Writer is the GREATEST MELANCHOLY and VEXATION that can befall."

In the Case of a *perpetual Privilege and Monopoly*, the Bookseller becomes the Author's LEAVE-GIVER: Many a Jaunt may be made that his new INSERTIONS may be viewed, and at length he may sit down with the MELANCHOLY and VEXATION of leaving his Book WORSE THAN HE COULD MAKE IT.

- XI. Should the Work, pursuant to the Statute of Queen Anne, revert to the AUTHOR in fourteen Years, he will become the Guardian of his own Fame; and, in Consequence, *learned and industrious Men will be enabled to reap not only the Fame, but the Profits of their Labours, to the Honour and Advantage of themselves and their Families.*

*Objection.* It has been colourably said, that for a *perpetual Property* Authors may rise in their Demand, and gain a much LARGER SUM for the Copy; or they may publish upon their own Account, and feel the Pulse of the Public before they dispose of the Copy.

*Answer.* Except one or two very modern Instances, a competent Price has not been given. If Booksellers have hitherto been dealing under an Idea of a PERPETUAL MONOPOLY, they have not paid an adequate Compensation for it, and the same Phlegm will govern their future Transactions. It is a melancholy Consideration, that even a Writer of Mr. THOMPSON'S Merit does not appear to have received ONE HUNDRED POUNDS for the Poems of the SEASONS. The whole Sum paid to him for a Variety of Articles was 242l. 10s. The Tragedy of SOPHONISEA, at the old Price for a Play, was worth 105l. The Poem, sacred to the Memory of Sir ISAAC NEWTON, BRITANNIA, and an Essay on *Descriptive Poetry*, from the Pen of THOMPSON, were worth a considerable Sum. How much remains for the Seasons? no Work of late Years has been more generally received: The Profits to MILLAR must have been large, and, after all, the Copy sold for 505l. at a public Auction.

If Authors had always Access to a CLARENDON PRESS, where the precise Number ordered would be printed, and no more, the Impression might be distributed to the London Booksellers, and an Author might stand the Hazard. But AUTHORS are not often in that Situation, and, besides, the immediate Expence of Paper and Print is not favourable to such Experiments.

A Period of fourteen Years is a sure Test of every Book. If, after that Time, it be worth reprinting, the Authors ACCURATEST THOUGHTS may be interwoven, and the *Fame* and *Profit* will accrue to the Man of Labour and Invention.

But if a PERPETUAL PRIVILEGE and MONOPOLY are to interrupt his Hopes, the PURCHASERS of the Copy will be enriched, and, in the emphatic Words of DRYDEN, "It will continue to be the Ingratitude of Mankind, that they who TEACH WISDOM by the SUREST MEANS, shall generally live poor AND UNREGARDED; as if they were born ONLY FOR THE PUBLIC, and had no Interest in their own well-being, but were to be LIGHTED UP LIKE TAPERS, and waste themselves for THE BENEFIT OF OTHERS."

E. THURLOW.  
J. DALRYMPLE.  
AR. MURPHY.



Thomas Becker, Peter Abraham, de  
Hondt, John Rivington, William  
Longman, William Richardson, John  
Richardson, Thomas Lowndes, Tho-  
mas Cadlon, George Kenley, Henry  
Baldwin, William Owen, Thomas  
Davies, and Thomas Cadell, Prin-  
ters and Bookellers,

Respondents.

The Appellant's CASE.

To be heard at the Bar of the House of Lords,  
on Friday the 4th of February, 1774.

